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Jurisdictional Statement 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated (UCA) § 78-2a-3, to hear appeals in family law cases 
Statement of Issues with Standards of Review 
Appellee asserts the following issues on appeal, responding to Appellant's asserted issues: 
First Issue: Can a trial court interpret and enforce a Decree of Divorce on an Order to 
Show Cause or motion calendar without any filing of a petition for modification? 
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals has the authority to interpret questions of 
statutory correctness "giving no deference to the trial court's interpretation [citations omitted]." 
Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036,1038 (Utah App. 1994). 
Second Issue: When a trial court issues and order interpreting and enforcing a Decree of 
Divorce, is it appropriate to characterize that interpretation as a modification and appeal the trial 
court's decision as if that decision was a new appealable final order? 
Standard of Review: Questions of the applications of law are reviewed for correctness. 
Third Issue: Does the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, 50 USC §§ 501, etseq., 
(hereafter referred to in this document as the "Soldiers' and Sailors' Act") prevent the Trial Court 
from interpreting and enforcing Appellant's ongoing alimony obligation or granting Appellee 
other relief she requested? 
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Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals has the authority to interpret questions of 
statutory correctness "giving no deference to the trial court's interpretation [citations omitted]." 
Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036,1038 (Utah App. 1994). 
Preservation of Issues 
Issues are reserved for the purposes of appeal by raising them at the trial court such that 
the trial court has the opportunity to rule on the issue. Searle v. Searle, 38 P.3d 307, 313 (Utah 
App. 2001), citations omitted. 
In the present case the issues raised on appeal were raised at the hearings held to interpret 
and enforce the Decree of Divorce entered in this matter. The Court heard argument, proffers of 
counsel, objections and other dicta typical of normal judicial discourse. Appellant's list of 
references to the record in this case suffices to demonstrate the issues raised and preserved for 
appeal (see Brief of Appellant, pp. 6-7). 
Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances & Rules 
Statutes: 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(7) 
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, 50 USC §§ 501, et seq. 
Rules: 
Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
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Statement of the Case 
Nature of the case: 
This case concerns an action to enforce the Decree of Divorce granted in this matter on 6 
April 2004, concerning the issue of alimony. Appellant/Respondent reduced his payment of 
alimony to Appellee/Petitioner. Appellee/Petitioner sought to enforce Appellant's/Respondent's 
alimony obligation awarded her in the Decree. Appellant/Respondent claimed that the Decree 
indicated a reduction in his alimony payment merely upon transfer from the U.S. Army base at 
which he was stationed during the pendency of the divorce proceedings. Appellee/Petitioner 
claimed that it was not the location of employment, but the actuality of Appellant's/Respondent's 
employment which was determinative in reducing the alimony obligation, and that since 
Appellant/Respondent simply transferred his employment - for essentially identical pay - from one 
U.S. Army base to another, his alimony obligation should not be reduced, but remain the same. 
The trial court agreed, although granting a temporary reduction in the amount of alimony for the 
few weeks between Appellant's/Respondent's job during the pendency of the divorce action and 
the start of his new-but-equal job at a different location. 
Course of Proceedings: 
Upon Appellant's/Respondent's reduction in alimony payments, Appellee/Petitioner filed 
an Order to Show Cause, which was issued by the Trial Court. Although the matter was 
continued a number of times, as indicated in the court record, without any objection by 
Appellant/Respondent concerning sufficiency of service upon him of the Order to Show Cause, 
the matter was finally heard on 26 August 2004 (Record at 82-5), at which time neither 
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Appellant/Respondent nor his counsel appeared. A Default Order granting the relief sought by 
Appellee/Petitioner was granted. 
Appellant/Respondent subsequently objected to the entry of the Default Order, and in a 
telephonic hearing, the Court Commissioner set aside the default and the original Order to Show 
Cause was noticed up for hearing, which was held on 18 November 2004 (Record at 110-1, 140) 
before the Court Commissioner. Appellant/Respondent did not object to the Court 
Commissioner's ruling and request an evidentiary hearing before a trial judge, as specified in the 
Rules, but instead characterized the proceeding as a modification (rather than an interpretation 
and enforcement) of the Decree and filed an appeal from the Court's 18 November 2004 Order on 
Order to Show Cause, which was signed by a District Court Judge on 31 January 2005 and 
entered into the record on 2 February 2005. 
Disposition at Trial Court: 
The Decree of Divorce was entered by the Trial Court on 6 April 2004, enforced by the 
Trial Court's Commissioner (by default Order) at a hearing held on 26 August 2004, set aside by 
the Courts Commissioner, and subsequently re-enforced by the Trial Court on 2 February 2005 
after the hearing held on 18 November 2004. At no time has Appellee/Petitioner sought to 
modify the Decree of Divorce, but simply has sought to enforce it. 
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Statement of Relevant Facts 
1. A Decree of Divorce (hereafter "Decree") entered in this matter on 6 April 2005 
by the Fourth District Court. 
2. The Decree was prepared pursuant to a Stipulation of the Parties signed by both 
parties and their attorneys. Said Stipulation was prepared by 
Appellant' s/Respondent' s attorney.] 
3. The Decree was prepared by Appellant's/Respondent's counsel, and was sent to 
the undersigned2 prior to being submitted to the Court, as required under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. No objection was made by Appellee/Petitioner, and the 
Decree (as well as the accompanying Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) 
were subsequently signed by the Trial Court judge. 
4. The Decree of Divorce provides that Appellee/Petitioner is awarded alimony in the 
amount of $866 per month. The Decree further provided that, in the event 
Appellant/Respondent was demobilized, his alimony obligation would be reduced 
to $200 per month. 
5. In May 2004 Appellant/Respondent was temporarily demobilized. However, at 
'Appellant's counsel looked at the line "Attorneys for Petitioner" under the names at the 
top left corner of the pleadings (Stipulation, for the purposes of this paragraph) and there, 
apparently, ended his analysis. As the record clearly shows, Kristy L. Hanson was 
Appellant's/Respondant's attorney, not Petitioner's attorney. As demonstrated by all the 
pleadings prepared by the undersigned, I (Sidney Balthasar Unrau) exclusively represented the 
Appellee/Petitioner in this matter 
2Apparently this point was missed by Appellant's counsel (see previous note), who 
assumed to the contrary and based part of Appellant's argument on this missed point. See 
Appellant's "Brief of Appellant" at point IV on pages 18-9. 
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that time, Appellant/Respondent had new orders, and was re-mobilized after a few 
weeks, earning essentially identical pay as he had earned during the pendency of 
the Divorce. 
6. After several attempts by Appellee/Petitioner to convince Appellant/Respondent 
that he was violating the clear language of the Decree, Appellee/Petitioner filed a 
Motion for Order to Show Cause, together with its accompanying Affidavit, in 
July 2004. 
7. Appellant/Respondent hired an attorney to respond to the Order to Show Cause, 
and did not object concerning the sufficiency of service of the Order to Show 
Cause. 
8. At the request of Appellant's/Respondent's counsel, the hearing on 
Appellee's/Petitioner's Motion for Order to Show Cause was continued a few 
times and was finally set for hearing on 26 August 2005. 
9. Appellant/Respondent failed to appear at the hearing on 26 August 2005 and a 
Default Order, granting the relief sought by Appellee/Petitioner, subsequently 
issued. 
a. The Order on Order to Show Cause resulting from this hearing was not 
entered by the Court until 10 or 11 November 2004, which, as will be 
demonstrated below, is after the date that it was set aside.3 
3The confusion arises because the Order is clearly signed by the Trial Judge on 11 
November 2004, yet the clerk's notation on the front page of the Order, presumably made at the 
time of the entry of the Order in the Court's Registry of Actions, indicates that the Order was 
entered on 10 November 2004. It appears that either the judge or the clerk was mistaken 
concerning the date. 
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10. Appellant/Respondent hired new counsel and objected to the entry of the Default 
Order. 
11. The Default Order was subsequently set aside at a telephonic hearing on 13 
October 2004. 
12. Appellee's/Petitioner's Motion for Order to Show Cause was subsequently heard 
at a hearing before the Court Commissioner on 18 November 2004. 
13. The Order on Order to Show Cause which issued from the 18 November 2004 
hearing was prepared by the undersigned pursuant to the Court's ruling after 
proffers of counsel and argument before the Court Commissioner. 
14. Among other things, the Court ruled that: 
a. The Appellant's/Respondent's reduction in alimony, pursuant to the clear 
intent and language of the Decree of Divorce - which had been prepared by 
his own counsel - was to follow a substantial reduction in income, not 
merely a change of location of his employment; 
b. The Appellant's/Respondent's current employment was substantially 
identical to that which he had at the time of the entry of the Decree; 
c. The Appellant/Respondent was justified in temporarily reducing his 
alimony payment for the short time - three weeks - between his 
substantially-identical assignments; 
d. The Appellant/Respondent was not in contempt of Court for violating the 
Order of the Court because "...there was a legitimate misunderstanding of 
the Decree of Divorce [concerning the issue of the payment of alimony]" 
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(see Order on Order to Show Cause (18 November 2004), at paragraph 6); 
and 
e. Whereas the Soldiers' and Sailors' Act prevents the prosecution of new 
action under certain conditions, it does not prevent the enforcement of a 
valid Order, in this case, the parties' Decree of Divorce. 
15. The Order on Order to Show Cause (18 November 2004) also modified the 
previous award of attorney's fees, requiring that each party should pay her or his 
own attorney's fees, except for the attorney's fees awarded in conjunction with 
setting aside the default Order. 
16. Neither party objected to the Commissioner's ruling. 
17. Appellant's current counsel filed a Notice to Appeal on 10 December 2004. 
18. Some time in April, presumably, Appellant wrote and sent a Brief on Appeal and 
sent two unsigned undated copies to Appellee's counsel. 
Summary of Argument 
Point One: Did the Trial Court modify the Decree of Divorce entered in this matter, or did it 
simply clarify and enforce the Decree? Appellant/Respondent has mischaracterized the post-
divorce proceedings as a modification of the Decree of Divorce, rather than an interpretation and 
enforcement of said Decree. 
Point Two: Can a Trial Court interpret and enforce a Decree of Divorce? Clearly, the answer 
to this question is yes. Since no modification of the Decree of Divorce was entered, there was no 
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procedural impropriety in obtaining the Order on Order to Show Cause (18 November 2004). 
This present appeal is entirely based on a mischaracterization of the procedural history of this 
matter subsequent to the entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter. Appellant/Respondent 
argues that the Order on Order to Show Cause (18 November 2004) is a modification, rather than 
an enforcement of the parties' Decree. 
Point Three: The Soldiers' and Sailors' Act does not prevent the enforcement of a currently 
valid Order of the Court. 
Argument 
Point One: Did the Trial Court modify the Decree of Divorce entered in this matter, or did it 
simply clarify and enforce the Decree? 
L Characterization of Appellee's Enforcement Efforts as a Modification Attempt 
It has long been the stance of Utah law that a party seeking to enforce an Order may do so 
by filing a Motion for Order to Show Cause. Appellant/Respondent asks: Can a Trial Court 
modify a Decree of Divorce on an Order to Show Cause or Motion calendar without any filing of 
a petition for modification? The short answer is no. The Trial Court "has continuing jurisdiction 
to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material 
change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce" (Utah Code Annotate 
(hereafter UCA) §30-3-5(7) (1953, as amended). This doctrine has long been upheld by Utah 
Courts, and the burden of proving a substantial change in circumstances rests clearly with the 
moving party. See Wells v. Wells, 871 P.3d 1036, 1040 (Utah App. 1994), citing, Whitehouse v. 
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Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P.2d 707, 710 
(Utah 1985)) ("a substantial change of circumstances occurring since the entry of the decree and 
not contemplated in the decree itself). 
Furthermore, "[n]o request for a modification of an existing decree shall be raised by way 
of an order to show cause." Grover v. Grover, 839 P.2D 871, 873 (Utah App. 1992). 
However, in the present case, no modification of the Decree of Divorce was sought or 
obtained. Rather, the parties varied in their interpretation of the Decree, and Appellee/Petitioner 
subsequently sought relief. The Trial Court ruled that there had been a legitimate 
misunderstanding of the language of the Decree, and ruled substantially in favor of 
Appellee/Petitioner. 
Furthermore, though Appellant/Respondent was represented by counsel throughout post-
divorce process, at no time was there a Motion to Strike or any similar Motion submitted to the 
Court setting forth the argument that Appellant/Respondent sets forth in his Appeal, that 
Appellee's/Petitioner's various attempts to enforce the alimony provision of her Decree of 
Divorce was, in fact, an attempt to obtain a modification of the Decree. 
IL Interpretation of the Decree's Alimony Provision 
The Decree of Divorce sets forth, that alimony (to be paid by Appellant to Appellee) is 
awarded as follows: 
"It is reasonable and proper that while Respondent is employed in this present 
capacity as a major with the United States Army in Fort Carson, Colorado, 
Respondent pay alimony to Petitioner in the amount of $866.00 per month... 
continuing until Respondent [Appellant/Mr. Nelson] is demobilized or until such 
time as Petitioner [Appellee/Ms. Nelson] remarries, cohabits, or dies, whichever 
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occurs first. The parties agree that upon Respondent's demobilization, Alimony 
will be reduced to $200.00 per month... continuing for a period of 7 years..." 
(Decree, paragraph 10, emphasis added.) 
Appellant asserts that the Trial Court's ruling modified the Decree rather than simply 
interpreting and enforcing the Decree. Appellant's argument is based upon focusing on the 
phrases "...is demobilized..." and "...upon Respondent's demobilization...," completely 
ignoring the controlling phrase in the start of the paragraph, "...while Respondent is employed 
in this present capacity as a major with the United States Army..." In fact, 
Appellant/Respondent failed to even quote that part of the relevant paragraph from the Decree in 
his recitation thereof. 
The undisputed fact is that Appellant/Respondent is still employed as a major with the 
United States Army, and that the correct characterization of his temporary demobilization is as a 
transition between assignments, which transition lasted, according to the undisputed record, 
approximately three weeks. 
The phrase "...at Fort Carson, Colorado..." in the Decree is not determinative in the 
obligation of alimony. Rather, that was simply where Appellant/Respondent was employed during 
the Divorce proceedings, and for several months thereafter. 
The obvious problem is that the alimony provision is, on its face, arguably ambiguous. 
That does not mean that the provision is, actually, ambiguous. As previously noted, 
Appellant/Respondent cited only part of the relevant provision of the Decree, leaving out the 
language that automatically resolves the ambiguity - concerning the contingency of alimony on 
Appellant's/Respondent's employment in his then-present capacity. The language of the Decree 
exactly parallels the language set forth in the parties' Stipulation, upon which the Decree of 
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Divorce is based. A Stipulation is recognized as an agreement between parties, as binding as an 
order resulting from it. See Davis v. Davis, 29 P.3d 676 (Utah App. 2001) (parallel citations 
omitted). 
Assuming, arguendo, that the language of the alimony provision of the Decree is 
ambiguous, then the Trial Court is competent to resolve such ambiguity. Appellant/Respondent 
argues, using language set forth in Parks Enterprises, Inc. v. New Century Realty, Inc., 652 P.2d 
918, 920 (Utah 1982) ("It is also settled law that a contract will be construed against its drafter"), 
that any ambiguity should be resolved in his (Appellant's/Respondent's) favor, assuming, as 
pointed out earlier, that Appellee's/Petitioner's attorney drafted the Decree. However, both the 
Stipulation and the Decree were drafted by Appellant's/Respondent's attorney, and not by 
Appellee's/Petitioner's attorney. Therefore, all ambiguity should be resolved in favor of 
Appellee/Petitioner. The Trial Court was well aware of the Parks Enterprises doctrine and 
applied it in Ms. Nelson's favor, resolving any apparent ambiguity in against 
Appellant/Respondent. 
Appellant's/Respondent's analysis is therefore fatally flawed on the issue of ambiguity, if, 
in fact, ambiguity exists, as it is based on the wrong assumption concerning whose attorney 
drafted the final documents (Stipulation, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Decree of 
Divorce) in this matter. 
Logically, if Appellant/Respondent had been entitled to an automatic reduction of his 
alimony obligation due to a substantial change of circumstances (as contemplated in the Decree) 
he would have similarly been entitled to a reduction in his child support obligation based on a 
substantial change of circumstances (not contemplated in the Decree). Appellant/Respondent has 
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never sought such a reduction in child support, presumably because he has no grounds to do so. 
Point Two: Can a Trial Court interpret and enforce a Decree of Divorce? 
A Trial Court is clearly empowered to enforce its own orders, including a Decree of 
Divorce. Appellee/Petitioner simply sought to enforce the clear provisions of the Decree of 
Divorce concerning alimony, since Appellant/Respondent simply reduced his alimony payment 
when he was between assignments for three weeks. 
Preliminarily, Appellee/Petitioner addresses the procedural issues sprinkled throughout 
Appellant's/Respondent's Brief. Although not apparent from the Trial Court's record, or in the 
docket of the Court, Appellee's efforts to enforce her Decree of Divorce was not objected to. 
Appellant/Respondent repeatedly points out that the record (or docket of the Trial Court) does 
not show all the steps which one would expect (including such things as proof of service of an 
Order to Show Cause, or even a record of the Motion to Set Aside Default Order). However, 
none of the procedural oddities is germane to the central question of whether the Trial Court had 
the authority to interpret and enforce the Decree. 
Appellant's/Respondent's entire argument is based on characterizing the enforcement -
including the interpretation - of the Decree by the Trial Court as a modification. Since no 
modification of the Decree of Divorce was entered, there was no procedural impropriety in 
obtaining the ultimate Order on Order to Show Cause (18 November 2004), which sets forth the 
relief granted by the Trial Court in interpreting and enforcing the Decree. 
Appellant/Respondent argues that the Order on Order to Show Cause (18 November 
2004) is a modification, rather than an enforcement of the parties' Decree. Appellant/Respondent 
-15-
provided no authority for characterizing an interpretation and enforcement as a modification, but 
simply assumed that his characterization is correct. 
Point Three: The Soldiers' and Sailors' Act does not prevent the enforcement of a currently 
valid Order of the Court. 
Although the clear language of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Act ("the Act," for the purposes 
of this argument) is to protect those on active duty in the United States Military from having to 
defend a lawsuit affecting the status quo of his or her property, see Hanson v. Crown Toyota 
Motors, Inc., 572 P.2d 380,381 (Utah, 1977), nothing in the Act restricts the enforcement of an 
Order of the Court, including a Decree of Divorce. If a Petition to Modify had, in fact, been filed 
in this matter, then it is at least arguable that Appellant/Respondent could successfully avoid 
having to defend such an action under the Act. Appellant has not even demonstrated that he is 
subject to the provisions of the Act, but even if he is, since there is (or was) no action to defend, 
he has no valid reason to invoke the Act. 
In fact, it is common practice for members of the U.S. military to have to pay their 
financial obligations, including child support and alimony, to former spouses. There is no 
abatement of obligation, or stay of obligation, merely due to the fact that a soldier is on active 
duty. In the present case, Appellant/Respondent continues to pay child support as ordered. It 
would be wholly against public policy for the Court to allow Appellant/Respondent to cease from 
paying child support, and then tell the mother raising the children, "sorry, but there is nothing you 
can do to enforce the child support obligation because of the Act." 
Looking at the Soldiers' and Sailors' Act table of contents, there is no mention of family 
-16-
obligations. However, Army Regulation (hereafter "Army Reg.") 608-99, under Section 1-5 
(Management of personal affairs), states, in part: 
11
 a. The Army recognizes the transient nature of military duty. This 
regulation, however, prohibits the use of a soldier's military status or 
assignment to deny financial support to family members or to evade court 
orders on financial support, child custody and visitation, paternity, and 
related matters." 
Army Reg. 608-99, Section l-5(a), emphasis added. The clear language of the cited regulation, 
"...prohibits the use of a soldier's military status," would tend to preclude the conclusion argued 
by Appellant/Respondent, who concludes that Section 524 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act, 
Section 524, "...by its very terms, stays executions on judgments or orders" including, 
presumably, provisions for alimony {see Brief of Appellant, page 24, paragraph prior to 
"Conclusion" section). 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court had jurisdiction to interpret and enforce the provisions of the Decree of 
Divorce entered between the parties in this matter. There was no modification of the Decree 
entered by the Trial Court. Rather, the Trial Court, after appropriately issuing an Order to Show 
Cause, considered the arguments of the parties and ruled. 
Although Appellee/Petitioner did not believe that the Decree was ambiguous concerning 
Appellant's/Respondent's obligation to pay alimony, the Trial Court nevertheless applied the well-
established legal doctrine correctly resolved the ambiguity against the party which drafted the 
Decree, in this case, Appellant/Respondent. 
Finally, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act 
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prohibits the Court from enforcing a soldier's alimony obligation. In fact, the U.S. Army's own 
regulations appear to contradict that assertion. 
The ruling of the Trial Court therefore needs to be upheld. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \[(fr day of June, 2005. 
A. 
SIDNEY B ALTHAS AR UNRAU 
Attorney for Appellee 
Certificate of Service 
The undersigned certifies that on the \(p*^ day of June, 2005, two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Response Brief were deposited in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, or, in 
the alternative, were hand-delivered (if so indicated, below) to the following (or his office): 
David R. Hartwig, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellant 
1817 S. Main Street #17 
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KRISTY L. HANSON (9680) 
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
226 W. 2230 North 
P.O. Box 657 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: (801) 375-3000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
I 
I 
TRACY LYNN NELSON 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JEFFREY SCOTT NELSON 
Respondent. 
| DECREE OF DIVORCE 
j Civil No. 034402243 
Based on the accompanying Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. That the parties are hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce, said Decree to become 
final upon its being signed by the court and entered m the Office of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court Clerk. 
2. Children: There are four minor children who are issue of this marriage, to wit: 
David A Nelson, born 15 April 1989; 
Michael K. Nelson, bom 16 Defcbmber 1990; 
FILED 
:>ut1n Judicial District Court 
Hi ah County, State of Utah 
Deputy 
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Christopher T. Nelson, bom 9 June 1992; 
Joseph H. Nelson, bom 8 April 1996 
3. Custody and Visitation: Both parties are awarded the permanent joint legal 
custody of the parties' four minor children, to wit: David A. Nelson, bom 15 April 1989; 
Michael K. Nelson, bom 16 December 1990; Christopher T. Nelson, born 9 June 1992; Joseph 
H. Nelson, bom 8 April 1996, with Petitioner being the physical custodial parent, subject to 
Respondent's rights of reasonable and liberal visitation and subject to the parenting plan 
incorporated herewith. The Petitioner will be allowed to make the day to day decisions 
regarding the children when the children are in her physical custody and Respondent will be 
allowed to make the day to day decisions regarding the children when the children are in his 
physical custody. Neither party will be allowed to make the major decisions regarding the 
children without consulting with the other parent, 
PARENTING PLAN 
a. Parental Responsibility: Each party will be restrained from making 
derogatory or disparaging remarks about the other party to the children, or in any way attempting 
to diminish the love and respect the children have for the other party. 
b. Limitations on removing the children: Neither party can remove the 
children from their home state if it will in any way infringe upon the custodial or visitation rights 
of the other party, except as provided for below. Furthermore, neither party can remove the 
children from the territory of the United States without giving at least 30 days' notice, but in any 
event custodial or visitation rights cannot be infringed upon without prior written consent of the 
2 
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other party. In the event either party intends to move to another state or more than 150 miles 
from his or her residence at the time of filing of this action, she or he will notify the other party 
in writing at least 30 days in advance. 
c. Religious Ordinances: Respondent will have the right to perform any 
religious ordinances that the father usually performs pertaining to the children. 
d. Minimum Schedule: The schedule outlined in Attachment A is to be 
construed as a minimum schedule for visitation while Respondent is residing outside the state of 
Utah. The schedule outlined in Attachment B is to be construed as a minimum schedule for 
visitation when Respondent returns to the State of Utah. The parties are free to adjust the 
schedule to allow more visitation for the non-custodial parent as suits their needs and desires, if 
mutually agreed. If a particular set pick-up time is impossible to accomplish due to 
circumstances beyond the reasonable control of either party, such as work schedule, that 
visitation is to be exercised to the extent possible. 
e. Visitation schedules mutually agreed upon by both parties are preferable to a 
court-imposed solution. 
f. The visitation schedule will be utilized to maximize the continuity and stability of 
the child's life. 
g. The parties should give special consideration to make the child available to attend 
family functions including funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious holidays, important 
ceremonies, and other significant events in the life of the child or in the life of either parent 
which may inadvertently conflict with the parent-time schedule. 
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h. The noncustodial parent will pick up the child at the times specified and return the 
child at the times specified, and the child's regular school hours will not be interrupted. 
i. The custodial parent will have the child ready for parent-time at the time lie is to 
be picked up and will be present at the custodial home or will make reasonable alternate 
arrangements to receive the child at the time he is returned. 
j . The court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably 
accommodate the work schedule of both parents and may increase the parent-time allowed to the 
noncustodial parent but will not diminish the standardized parent-time provided in Sections 30-3-
35 and 30-3-35.5. 
k. Neither parent-time nor child support is to be withheld due to either parent's 
failure to comply with a court-ordered parent-time schedule. 
I. The custodial parent will notify the noncustodial parent within 24 hours of 
receiving notice of all significant school, social, sports, and community functions in which the 
child is participating or being honored, and the noncustodial parent will be entitled to attend and 
participate fully. 
m. The noncustodial parent will have access directly to all school reports including 
preschool and daycare reports and medical lecords and will be notified immediately by the 
custodial parent m the event of a medical emergency, 
n. Each parent will provide the other with his current address and telephone number 
within 24 hours of any change. 
o. Each parent will permit and encourage liberal telephone contact during reasonable 
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hours and uncensored mail privileges with the child. 
p. Parental care will be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate care 
and the court will encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if 
willing and able, to provide child care. 
q. Each parent will provide all surrogate care providers with the name, current 
address, and telephone number of the other parent and will provide the noncustodial parent with 
the name, current address, and telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the court 
for good cause orders otherwise; and 
r. For emergency purposes, whenever the child travels with either parent, all of the 
following will be provided to the other parent: 
(i) an itinerary of travel dates; 
(ii) destinations; 
(iii) places where the child or traveling parent can be reached; and 
(iv) the name and telephone number of an available third person who would be 
knowledgeable of the child's location. 
7. Child Support: Respondent is presently employed as a Major with the 
United States Army in Fort Carson, Colorado. His present salary is $6,619.00 per month. It is 
reasonable and proper that while Respondent is employed in this capacity, he will pay child 
support to the Petitioner in the amount of $1,614.00 per month, with one-half due on or before 
(he 5th and one-haff due on or before tht 20lh of eacfi month and continuing unfif each of the 
children reach age 18 or graduate from high school with their regular matriculating class, 
whichever occurs later. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.10, child support will be 
adjusted as each of the children become emancipated factoring in the remaining number of 
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children and applying the parties' incomes as determined at the time of the Divorce Decree. 
8. Modification of child support: It is reasonable and proper that when Respondent 
is released from active duty with the United States Army and when Respondent resumes his 
previous employment with Westar Corporation or resumes a new employment position, child 
support will be recalculated based upon Respondent's new salary and Respondent need not prove 
that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred. Prior to recalculating child support, the 
Respondent will provide Petitioner with documentation verifying any change in income/salary. 
9. Child Care Costs: It is reasonable and proper that Respondent be obligated to 
pay one-half of any work-related childcare costs that Petitioner incurs on behalf of the parties' 
minor children, with said payments to be made by the Respondent to the Petitioner within fifteen 
(15) days of proof of said costs. 
10. Alimony: It is reasonable and proper that while Respondent is employed in 
his present capacity as a major with the United States Army in Fort Carson, Colorado, 
Respondent pay alimony to Petitioner in an amount of $886.00 per month, with one-half due on 
or before the 5lh and one-half due on or before the 20th of each month, continuing until 
Respondent is demobilized or until such time as Petitioner remarries, cohabits, or dies, 
whichever first occurs. Upon Respondent's demobilization, Alimony will be reduced to $200.00 
per month, with one-half due on or before the 5th and one-half due on or before the 20M of each 
month, continuing for a period of 7 years from demobilization or until such time as Petitioner 
remarries, cohabits, or dies, whichever first occurs. 
11. Personal Property: During the course of the marriage the parties acquired 
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personal property, which personal property will be equitably divided between the parties. In 
connection with the foregoing provision, it is agreed that the following property will be divided 
between the parties as follows: 
A. Petitioner will receive the 1995 Dodge Caravan, subject to her assumption of all 
debt and liability on said vehicle and she will hold Respondent harmless from liability. 
B. Respondent will receive the 2002 Mitsubishi Lancer, subject to his assumption of 
all debt and liability on said vehicle and he will hold Respondent harmless from liability. 
12. Marital Debt: During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired debts 
and obligations which will be divided as follows: 
A. USAA Federal Savings Credit Card: During the marriage, the parties 
accumulated $8,700.00 on the USA Federal Savings Credit Card. The parties also 
accumulated debt on four other credit cards, all in Petitioner's name, including Target 
VISA card, a Target Charge Card, Capital One Gold Card, Capital One Platinum card, 
with an approximate cumulative debt of $2,200. The parties also took out a personal loan 
in Petitioner's name from Beneficial Financial, the proceeds of which were used for 
family bills prior to Respondent's moving out, in the approximate amount of $6,100, 
i. Petitioner will be wholly responsible for, and hold Respondent harmless from the 
four credit cards and the personal loan exclusively in her name. 
ii. Respondent will be wholly responsible for, and hold Petitioner harmless from, all 
debt on the USA Federal Savings Credit Card. 
B. Each party will be responsible for their own debts and obligations incurred 
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subsequent to the parties' separation. 
13. Real Property: During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired real 
property located at 1234 South 940 West in Provo, Utah. It is reasonable and proper that 
Petitioner be awarded the marital home, together with its debt and equity subject to an equitable 
lien in favor of Respondent in the amount of one-half the equity existing in the house at the time 
of the entry of the Divorce Decree, which is $300.l It is reasonable and proper that Petitioner 
will refinance and remove Respondent's name from the mortgage and indebtedness within two 
years of the entry of the Divorce or 30 days of Petitioner's remarriage or cohabitation, whichever 
first occurs. Respondent will be paid his equitable interest within 30 days of Petitioner's 
refinancing the house or Petitioner's remarriage or cohabitation, whichever first occurs. 
Petitioner also will provide Respondent with proof that she has made the monthly mortgage 
payment while Respondent's name is on the mortgage. 
14. Medical Insurance: It is reasonable and proper that Respondent provide 
medical insurance on behalf of the parties' minor children, with each party responsible for one-
half of any and all health, dental, accident, eye, orthodontia or counseling costs incurred on 
behalf of the parties' minor children that are not covered by insurance. Each party will also be 
responsible for one-half of the children's portion of the monthly premium. 
15. Tax exemption: It is reasonable and proper that Petitioner be allowed to 
claim the parties minor children, Michael and Christopher, as dependents for income tax 
purposes. It is reasonable and proper that Respondent be allowed to claim the parties' minor 
1
 The paities estimate $600.00 equity cuirently in the home. Respondent's V2 interest would theiefoie be $300.00. 
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childien, David and Joseph, as dependents foi income tax purposes 
16 Retnement It is leasonable and propei that each party will retain sole 
mteiest m his or hei own retirement funds, accounts or othei such interests, if any 
17 Petitioner's maiden name It is reasonable and propei that Petitioner be 
lestoied to her maiden name, Tracy Lynn Biyan 
18 Attorney's fees It is reasonable and propei that each paity will pay his or 
her own attorney's fees and costs incurred m pmsuing the divorce 
19 Miscellaneous It is just and piopei that the Court will enter an order 
lequirmg each party to execute whatever documents are necessary to execute the Ordei of the 
Court m this matter 
DATED this ^ day of /bfc n \ , 2004 ?A&  ,; 
AW A\ r M JOCUViENT ON FILE IN THE 




MINIMUM SCHEDULE FOR VISITATION WHILE RESPONDENT IS 
RESIDING OUT OF STATE 
Reasonable Visitation is defined as the parents may agree. If they are not able to agree, 
the definition of visitation for the non-custodial parent for school-age children is as 
follows: 
Transportation: While Respondent is residing in Fort Carson, Colorado, the parties 
agree to meet half-way, which is Grand Junction, Colorado, to exchange the children for 
visitation. The parties will select a mutually agreed upon time and location for the 
exchange. 
Holiday Visitation: (6:00 p.m. day before the holiday to 7:00 p.m. the day of the 
holiday, unless otherwise specified.) 
Odd Numbered Years 
(1) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday until Sunday 
(2) The fall school break, beginning the last day of school before the holiday until the 
day before school resumes 
(3) The entire winter school break period 
(4) Spring Break beginning the last day of school before the holiday until the day 
before school resumes. 
Even Numbered Years 
(1) President's day weekend beginning Friday at 6:00 p.m. and ending Monday at 
7:00 p.m. 
(2) Human Right's day weekend beginning Friday at 6:00 p.m. and ending Monday at 
7:00 p.m. 
(3) Labor day weekend beginning Friday at 6:00 p.m. and ending on Monday at 7:00 
p.m. 
Fathers Day will be spent with the father every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on 
the holiday; 
Mother's Day will be spent with the mother every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. 
on the holiday; 
Summer Visitation: The Children will reside with the Respondent during the Summer, 
subject to Petitioner's extended parent-time as follows: 




(2) The children will be returned to Petitioner the week before the school 
year begins. 
(3) The Petitioner will have two weeks of uninterrupted visitation at 
the option of the Petitioner. 
Telephone: Contact at reasonable hours, not monitored by other parent (2-3 
times per week is usually considered reasonable) 
Courtesy: Special consideration is to be given for special events (family 
reunions, weddings, religious ceremonies, etc.) The Courts encourage parents to 
be nice to each other for the good of the children. One of the factors that weighs 
heavily with the Court in considering a change in custody is how smoothly 
visitation occurs. Petitioner agrees to make a good faith effort to allow 
Respondent visitation with the children when Respondent is in Utah. 
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MINIMUM SCHEDULE FOR VISITATION WHILE RESPONDENT IS 
RESIDING IN UTAH 
Reasonable Visitation is defined as the paients may agiee If they aie not able to agree, 
the definition of visitation for the non-custodial parent for school-age childien is as 
follows 
Midweek: One weekday evening, specified by the non-custodial paient, fiom 
5 30-8 30 p m (eithei specify a paiticular day foi each week, or give 48 hours advance 
notice) Respondent will make a good faith effoit to accommodate the children's 
extracuniculai and church activities 
Alternate Weekends: Friday 6 00 p m to Sunday 7 00 p m 
Holiday Visitation: (6 00 p m day before holiday to 7 00 p m the day of the holiday, 
unless otherwise specified, Holidays take piecedence ovei the weekend visitation and 
weekend schedule does not change) 
Odd numbered years 
Human Rights Day 
Eastei (Friday 6 00 p m to Sunday 7 00 p m) 
Memorial Day (Fnday 6 00 p m to Monday 7 00 p m) 
July 24th to 11 00 pm 
VeteiansDay 
Day before oi after Child's Birthday (3 00 p m to 9 00 p m) 
Fust half of Chiistmas Vacation, including Christmas Eve and Chiistmas Day to 
1 00 pm 
Religious Holidays (each gets half) 
Even numbei ed yeai s 
New YeaisDay 
President's Day 
July 4th to 11 00 pm 
Labor Day (Fn 6 00 p m to Mon 7 00 p m 
Columbus day 
UEA Weekend (Wed 6 00 p m to Sun 7 00 p m ) 
Child's actual Birthday to 9 00 p m 
Thanksgiving (Wed 6 00 p m to Sunday 7 00 p m ) 
Second Half Chiistmas Vacation including 1 00 p m to 9 00 p m Christmas Day 




Mother's Day will be spent with the mother every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. 
on the holiday; 
Summer Visitation: The Children will reside with the Respondent during the Summer, 
subject to Petitioner's extended parent-time as follows: 
(1) The children will reside with Petitioner the week after the school year 
ends. 
(2) The children will be returned to Petitioner the week before the school 
year begins. 
(3) The Petitioner will have two weeks of uninterrupted visitation at 
the option of the Petitioner. 
(4) During the Summer, Petitioner will have visitation one weekday evening, 
specified by Petitioner, from 5:30-8:30 p.m. and will have alternate 
weekends from Friday 6:00 p.m. until Sunday 7:00 p.m. 
Telephone: Contact at reasonable hours, not monitored by other parent (2-3 
times per week is usually considered reasonable) 
Courtesy: Special consideration is to be given for special events (family 
reunions, weddings, religious ceremonies, etc.) The Courts encourage parents to 
be nice to each other for the good of the children. One of the factors that weighs 





I hereby certify that on the day of March 2004 I caused to be mailed first class 
mail, postage prepaid, tme and correct copies of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE OF DIVORCE to the following, 
U.S. First Class Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Sid Balthasar Unrau 
Attorney at Law 
3610 North University Ave., Ste 375 
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Family Support, Child Custody, and Paternity 
By order of the Secretary of the Army 
PETER J SCHOOMAKER 
General, United States Army 
Chief of Staff 
Official 
JOELB HUDSON 
Administrative Assistant to the 
Secretary of the Army 
History. This publication is a major 
revision 
Summary. This regulation prescribes 
Army policy on financial support of fam-
ily members, child custody and visitation, 
paternity, and related matters It also im-
plements Department of Defense (DOD) 
Directive 5525 9 with regard to soldiers 
and family members stationed or residing 
outside of the United States on couit-re-
lated requests for assistance arising from 
financial support, child custody and visita-
tion, paternity, and related cases 
Applicability, a This regulation applies 
to— 
(1) The Active Army, including cadets at 
the U S Military Academy 
(2) The U S Army Reserve on active duty 
pursuant to orders for 30 days or more 
(3) All members of the Army National 
Guard of the United States on active duty 
for 30 days or more 
(4) Members of the Aimy National Guard 
on active duty for 30 days or more pur-
suant to orders under Title 32, United 
States Code, except for the punitive provi-
sions of this regulation 
(5) Family members who are command-
sponsored and reside outside of the 
United States 
(6) Soldiers receiving full or partial pay 
and allowances while confined at the U S 
Disciplinary Barracks or other confine-
ment facilities 
b This regulation applies during 
mobilization 
c Paragraphs 2-5 and 2-11 of this regula-
tion are punitive with regard to soldiers 
A violation of either paragraph is 
separately punishable as a violation of a 
lawful general regulation under Article 
92, Uniform Code of Military Justice 
Penalties for violating either of these par-
agraphs include the full range of statutory 
and regulatory sanctions, both criminal 
and administrative These and other provi-
sions of this regulation may also be the 
basis for a commissioned, warrant, or 
noncommissioned officer to issue a lawful 
order to a soldier 
d Provisions of this regulation regarding 
compliance with court orders on financial 
support, child custody and visitation, pa-
ternity, and related matters apply to fam-
ily members who are command sponsored 
and reside outside of the United States 
Noncompliance with such orders may ad-
versely affect their continued entitlement 
to command sponsorship or the duration 
of their sponsor's military assignment out-
side of the United States 
Proponent and exception authority. 
The proponent of this regulation is the 
Judge Advocate General (TJAG) TJAG 
has the authority to approve exceptions to 
this regulation that are consistent with 
controlling law and regulation TJAG may 
delegate the approval authority, in writing, 
to a division chief within the proponent 
agency in the grade of colonel or the ci-
vilian equivalent 
Army management control process. 
This regulation is not subject to the re-
quirements of AR 11-2 and does not con-
tain management control provisions 
Supplementation. Supplementation of 
this regulation and the establishment of 
command and local forms are prohibited 
without prior approval from the Office of 
The Judge Advocate General, Legal As-
sistance Policy Division, 1777 North Kent 
Street, Rosslyn, VA 22209-2194 
Suggested improvements. Users are 
invited to send comments and suggested 
improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recom-
mended Changes to Publications and 
Blank Forms) directly to the Office of 
The Judge Advocate General, Legal As-
sistance Policy Division, 1777 North Kent 
Street, Rosslyn, VA 22209-2194 
Distribution. This publication is availa-
ble in electronic media only and is in-
tended for command levels A, B, C, D, 
and E for the Active Army, the Army 
National Guard of the United States, and 
the U S Army Reserve 
*This regulation supersedes AR 608-99 dated 1 November 1994 






a This regulation sets forth Department of the Army (DA) policy, responsibilities, and procedures on financial 
support of family members, child custody and visitation, paternity, and compliance with court orders regarding these 
and related matters 
b This regulation is designed to improve procedures for enforcing financial support, child custody, paternity, and 
1 elated obligations within the DA It preempts all other regulations on these matters within the DA This regulation 
should not be construed to cieate any right, benefit, or entitlement, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law or in 
equity, by a paity against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any other person 
c This regulation will not be construed to create any right to judicial review involving compliance or noncom-
pliance with this legulation by the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any other person 
1-2. References 
Required and related publications and prescribed and referenced forms are listed in appendix A 
1-3. Explanation of abbreviations and terms 
Abbreviations and special terms used in this regulation are explained in the glossary 
1-4. Responsibilities 
a The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) provides all Army policies on— 
(1) The obligation of soldiers to provide financial support to family members 
(2) The obligation of soldiers to comply with court orders on financial support, child custody and visitation, 
paternity, and related matters 
(3) The obligation of family members who are command-sponsored and reside outside the United States to comply 
with court orders on financial support, child custody and visitation, paternity, and related matters 
(4) The scope and nature of legal assistance services provided to soldiers and family members on financial suppon, 
child custody and visitation, paternity, and related matters 
(5) Handling and processing all requests for assistance from Government officials based on court orders pertaining 
to soldiers or family members stationed or residing outside the United States (see chap 4) 
(6) Handling and processing of all other inquiries received under this regulation 
b The Chief, Legal Assistance Policy Division, Office of The Judge Advocate General (OTJAG), will— 
(1) Establish procedures for handling, processing, and responding to the following 
(a) All requests for assistance from Government officials based on court orders pertaining to soldiers oi family 
members stationed or residing outside the United States (see chap 4) 
(b) All other inquiries received under this regulation 
(2) Piocess all requests for assistance from Government officials based on court orders, and all other inquiries under 
this regulation, received at Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), pertaining to soldiers or family members 
(3) Carry out the objectives of this regulation to piotect the interests of the Army and the legal rights and interests 
of each soldier and family member whose conduct is governed or affected by this legulation 
(4) Advise and assist HQDA agencies, commanders, staff judge advocates (SJAs), judge advocates, and DA civilian 
attorney employees on all matteis addressed by this regulation 
(5) Implement policies regaiding the scope and nature of legal assistance services provided to soldiers and their 
family members on financial support, child custody and visitation, paternity, and related cases 
c The Commander, U S Army Human Resources Command will implement and assist commanders with enforce-
ment of the policies in this regulation in all actions relating to the assignment of officer and enlisted personnel when 
consistent with other military lequirements (see paras l-5c, 3-106 and 4-3d) 
d Geneial Court-Martial Convening Authorities (GCMCAs) will— 
(1) Respond to all requests foi assistance from Government officials based on court ordeis and all other inquiiies 
leceived under this legulation (see chap 4) 
(2) Establish procedures within then commands to respond to requests for assistance fiom Government officials 
based on court oiders and all other mquiiies received under this legulation, particularly from geographically separated 
family members (see para 2-1) These piocedures will insuie that each inquiry received undei this regulation will be 
routed to the lesponsible commander in the most expeditious manner possible and that lesponses aie sent to all 
inquiries leceived undei this regulation 
(3) Authorize SJAs or other staff officeis (such as Director of Community and Family Activities, the post Adjutant 
General), as appropriate, to initiate official messages (using priority precedence) or other official inquiries (that is, for 
the commandei) to units located within other commands to obtain information or to request assistance under this 
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regulation for geographically separated family members Such messages or other inquiries may be drafted by an 
attorney pioviding legal assistance on behalf of a client whose complaint about a matter addressed by this regulation 
appears to be valid, but only after the client has waived the attorney-client privilege with regard to the release of 
information necessary to send the message The message will be sent as an official command message and not on 
behalf of the client The reply, when received, will be provided to the SJA Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3-2, 
the SJA will then release information from this reply to the client or the client's attorney, as appropriate 
(4) Establish procedures to ensure that subordinate commanders and soldiers within their commands aie thoroughly 
famihai with the piovisions of this regulation (see chap 5) 
(5) Take other actions, as appropriate, in enforcing the provisions of this regulation (see para 3-10) 
e Special Court-Mai tial Convening Authonties (SPCMCAs) will 
(1) Establish piocedures to ensure compliance with this regulation 
(2) Ensuie that subordinate commanders and soldiers within their commands are thoroughly familiar with the 
provisions of this regulation (see chap 5) 
(3) Monitor compliance with this regulation and actions taken in response to inquiries under this legulation 
(4) Deteimine, when requested to do so by a soldier under his or her command, whether to release that soldier from 
a support requnement of this regulation (see para 2-15) 
(5) Take other actions, as appropriate, in enforcing the provisions of this regulation (see para 3-10) 
/ Battalion commanders will— 
(1) Respond to all requests for assistance from Government officials based on court orders and all other inquiries 
received under this regulation (see chap 3) 
(2) Establish proceduies to ensure compliance with this regulation 
(3) Ensure that subordinate commanders and soldiers within their commands are thoroughly familiar with the 
provisions of this regulation (see chap 5) 
(4) Monitor compliance with this regulation and actions taken in response to inquiries under this regulation 
(5) Counsel soldiers and take other actions, as appropriate, in response to all inquiries received under this regulation 
(see para 3-4) 
(6) Sign replies to inquiries received under this regulation pertaining to soldiers involved in repeated or continuing 
violations of this regulation (See chap 3 for the required content and timeliness of all replies) 
(7) Determine, when requested to do so by a soldier under his or her command, whether a specific provision of this 
regulation releases that soldier from a requirement of this regulation (see paras 2-12, 2-13, and 2-14) 
(8) Forward, with recommendation, to the SPCMCA any request by a soldier to be released from a specific 
piovision of this regulation when the stated basis for release is not contained in paragraph 2-14 
(9) Take other actions, as appropriate, in enforcing the provisions of this regulation (see para 3-10) 
g Company commanders will— 
(1) Respond to all requests for assistance from Government officials based on court oiders, and all other inquiries 
leceived under this regulation (see chap 3) 
(2) Ensure that soldiers are thoroughly familiar with the provisions of this regulation (see chap 5) 
(3) Establish procedures to ensure compliance with this regulation 
(4) Counsel soldiers and take other actions, as appropriate, in response to all inquiries received under this regulation 
(see paia 3-4) 
(5) Sign lephes to inquiries received under this legulation except to inquiries routed to superior commanders 
pertaining to soldieis involved in repeated or continuing violations of this regulation (see para l-4/(6) and chap 3) All 
replies will confoim to the provisions of chaptei 3 with regard to timeliness and content 
(6) Forward, with recommendation, to the battalion commander any request by a soldier to be released fiom a 
specific provision of this legulation (see paias l-4e(4), l-4/(7), l-4/(8), and 2-12) 
(7) Take other actions, as appropriate, in enfoicmg the provisions of this regulation (see para 3-10) 
h Staff judge advocates will— 
(1) Provide legal advice to commanders and their staff on— 
(a) Application of this regulation, and other laws and regulations, to financial suppoit, child custody and visitation, 
paternity, and related cases arising undei this regulation 
(b) Disposition of requests from soldiers to be released from specific provisions of this regulation (see paias 
l-4e(4), 1-4^7), and 2-12) 
(c) Potential actions under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and other possible adverse actions, with 
lespect to violations of the punitive provisions of this regulation and violations of lawful ordeis issued to enforce this 
regulation 
(d) The type of information that may be released in replies to inquiries (see para 3-2) 
(e) Legal interpretations of this regulation 
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(2) Establish piocedures to avoid conflicts of interest while insuring that legal services and guidance are provided to 
all eligible clients and commanders, including— 
(a) Procedures to screen for conflicts of interest within the legal assistance office (see para \-9b) 
(b) Designating an office, other than legal assistance, to be responsible for providing command advice on issues 
related to this regulation (see para l-9c) 
(c) Procedures to insuie that attorneys avoid conflicts when transferred to other areas of responsibility within the 
SJA office 
1-5. Management of personal affairs 
a The Aimy recognizes the transient nature of military duty This regulation, however, prohibits the use of a 
soldier's military status or assignment to deny financial support to family members or to evade court orders on 
financial support, child custody and visitation, paternity, and related matters 
b Soldiers aie requued to manage their peisonal affairs in a manner that does not bring discredit upon themselves 
or the U S Aimy This responsibility includes— 
(1) Maintaining reasonable contact with family members so that their financial needs and welfare do not become 
official matteis of concern for the Army (see para 2-1) 
(2) Conducting themselves in an honorable manner with regard to parental commitments and responsibilities (see 
chap 2) 
(3) Pioviding adequate financial support to family members (see paras 2-3 through 2-9) 
(4) Complying with all court orders (see paras 2-2, 2-4, and 2-11) 
c Commanders and their staffs have a responsibility, when consistent with other military requirements, to ensure 
that any action or nonaction on their part does not encourage or facilitate violations of court orders or this regulation or 
avoidance of a judicial resolution of issues relating to paternity, child custody, or support by soldiers and family 
members 
(1) This regulation will be enforced in a timely and effective manner in all actions relating to assignment of office! 
and enlisted personnel when consistent with other military requirements 
(2) Befoie lecommending approval of requests for, or extensions of, military assignments outside of the United 
States, commanders and others responsible for making decisions on these matters will consider whether the soldier's 
assignment, or continued assignment, outside of the United States will adversely affect the legal rights of others m 
pending or anticipated court actions in the United States against the soldier, or against family members, or will result in 
a repeated or continuing violation of an existing state court order or this regulation If there is the potential for such an 
adverse affect, no assignment or extension of an assignment will be made absent a compelling need of the service. 
(3) This paiagraph does not prohibit a commander from assisting a soldier to invoke the protections of the Soldiers' 
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act 
d The policies of this regulation are solely intended as interim measures until pertinent issues are resolved m court 
or settled by agreement among the parties involved 
e Soldiers aie entitled to the same legal rights and privileges m state courts as civilians This regulation is not 
intended to be used as a guide by courts in determining any of the following 
(1) The existence or amount of a soldier's financial support obligations 
(2) The existence or extent of a soldier's child custody or visitation rights 
(3) The existence or extent of a soldier's rights or obligations in adjudicating paternity claims 
1-6. Penalties 
Peisonnel subject to the UCMJ who fail to comply with paragraph 2-5 or 2-11 are subject to punishment under the 
UCMJ as well as to adveise administrative action and othei adverse action authorized by applicable sections of the 
United States Code or Federal legulations Paragraphs 2-5 and 2-11 aie fully effective at all times, and a violation of 
either paiagraph is sepaiately punishable as a violation of a lawful general regulation under Aiticle 92, UCMJ, even in 
the absence of a pnor complaint from a family member or counseling by a commander These paragiaphs and other 
provisions of this legulation may also be the basis foi a commissioned, warrant, or noncommissioned officer to issue a 
lawful older to a soldiei 
1-7. Entitlement to military allowances 
a The financial support requirements of this regulation, in the absence of a court order or written support 
agreement, are stated in amounts equal to one of the following based on the soldiei's pay grade (see DOD 7000 14-R, 
para 260101) 
(1) Basic allowance foi housing (BAH) A military housing allowance based on the geographic duty location, pay 
grade, and dependency status 
(2) BAH II The BAH allowance without consideration of the geographic duty location-the equivalent of the former 
basic allowance for quarters 
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